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 Remedial Power of  
Administrative Tribunals 
Peter W. Hogg* 
I.  REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS 
The topic of this paper is the remedial power of administrative tri-
bunals. Can an administrative tribunal refuse to apply a potentially ap-
plicable law on the ground that the law is unconstitutional? Can the 
tribunal do so even if the law is part of its own empowering statute? We 
shall see that, for most adjudicative tribunals — those with the express 
or implied power to decide questions of law — the answer to both these 
questions is yes. Can an administrative tribunal make an order other 
than a refusal to apply an invalid law, for example, an injunction, a 
declaration or an award of costs, in order to remedy a breach of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?1 We shall see that for many 
tribunals — those that are “courts of competent jurisdiction” — the 
answer to this question is also yes. 
The Constitution Act, 1982 provides two remedial tracks for 
breaches of the Charter of Rights. One is the supremacy clause of sec-
tion 52, which automatically nullifies any law or act that is contrary to 
the Constitution of Canada. The other is the remedies clause of section 
24, which confers on a “court of competent jurisdiction” a discretionary 
power to award an appropriate and just remedy for breach of the Char-
ter of Rights. This article will address each of these provisions in turn, 
                                                                                                                                
*  Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; Scholar in Resi-
dence, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, Toronto. I acknowledge the help of Courtney Harris 
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1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(U.K.), 1982, c.11. 
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considering in each case whether administrative tribunals have the 
power to invoke the provision. 
II.  NULLIFICATION UNDER SECTION 52 
Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides as follows: 
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any 
law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to 
the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. 
This provision gives to the Charter and to the rest of the Constitu-
tion of Canada overriding effect. Any law that is inconsistent with the 
Constitution of Canada is “of no force or effect.” The provision provides 
an explicit basis for judicial review of legislation in Canada. Whenever 
a court is faced with a conflict between the Constitution of Canada and a 
potentially applicable law, the court is obliged to strike down the incon-
sistent law. The question for this paper is whether an administrative 
tribunal has the same power of judicial review. 
In Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v.  Douglas College,2 the Su-
preme Court of Canada held that an arbitration board, which had been 
appointed by the parties under a collective agreement, but which was 
empowered by statute to decide questions of law, had the power to de-
termine the constitutionality of a mandatory retirement provision in the 
collective agreement. In Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Rela-
tions Board),3 the Court held that a labour relations board, which had 
been created and empowered by statute to decide questions of law, had 
the power to determine the constitutionality of a provision in the em-
powering statute that denied collective bargaining rights to agricultural 
workers. In the Douglas College case, La Forest J. for the Court said: 
“A tribunal must respect the Constitution so that if it finds invalid a law 
it is called upon to apply, it is bound to treat it as having no force or 
effect.”4 This conclusion was entailed by the supremacy clause of sec-
tion 52(1). A tribunal was obliged to apply all the relevant law, which 
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3  [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5, [1991] S.C.J. No. 42. 
4  Supra, note 2, at 594. 
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included the Constitution, as well as the law contained in statutes, con-
tracts, and common law.  
In both Douglas College and Cuddy Chicks, the tribunals’ empow-
ering statutes expressly granted to the tribunals the power to decide 
questions of law. In two subsequent decisions, a majority of the Su-
preme Court of Canada held that the absence of an express power to 
decide questions of law precluded an administrative tribunal from decid-
ing Charter issues.5 These decisions were rather odd, because any statu-
tory tribunal, whether or not it has an express power to decide questions 
of law, must decide all questions of law or fact that are necessary to 
carry out its mandate. Except for the rare case where questions of law 
are actually withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the tribunal by its em-
powering statute, a tribunal cannot fold its hands and refuse to reach a 
decision just because the matter before it raises a question of law. 
Nearly all tribunals have an implied power to decide all questions of law 
that are relevant to reaching decisions that are called for by their man-
date.6 Once this is accepted, it is hard to see why the terms of the Con-
stitution should be excluded from the body of law that the tribunal may 
consider, especially since section 52 declares the terms of the Constitu-
tion to be “the supreme law of Canada.” Indeed, one might wonder 
whether Parliament or a legislature, which is itself powerless to enact a 
law in violation of the Charter, has the power to create an administrative 
tribunal that must apply a law that is in violation of the Charter.7 
The Supreme Court of Canada has now repudiated the two rulings 
that stipulated that only an express grant of power over questions of law 
would authorize an administrative tribunal to decide whether a potentially 
                                                                                                                                
5  Tétreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission), [1991] 2 
S.C.R. 22, [1991] S.C.J. No. 41 (Employment Insurance Board of Referees); Cooper v. 
Canada (Human Rights Commission) (sub nom. Bell v. Canada (Human Rights Commis-
sion)), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, [1996] S.C.J. No. 115 (Canadian Human Rights Commission). 
6  McLeod v. Egan, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 517 (arbitrator under collective agreement bound 
to interpret any statute potentially applicable to the dispute). 
7  In Tétreault-Gadoury, supra, note 5, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
Board of Referees was obliged to exclude persons over the age of 65 from unemployment 
insurance benefits, and the Board’s decision could not be upset on appeal or judicial review, 
despite the fact that the exclusion of persons over 65 was, according to the Court, contrary to 
the Charter of Rights. In Cooper, supra, note 5, the Court held, at para. 57, that the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission could not even consider the question whether its empowering 
statute violated the Charter in providing that it was not a discriminatory practice for an 
employer to dismiss an employee who had reached “the normal age of retirement.” 
154  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
applicable law offends the Charter. In Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compen-
sation Board) v. Martin,8 the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal 
of Nova Scotia was faced with a claim that the benefits provided by the 
province’s workers’ compensation plan for chronic pain were unconsti-
tutional for violation of section 15 of the Charter of Rights. (Sufferers 
from work-related chronic pain were provided with a standard, tempo-
rary program for their rehabilitation but were otherwise excluded from 
the benefits of the workers’ compensation plan.) The Supreme Court of 
Canada, in an opinion written by Gonthier J., held that the Tribunal had 
the power to rule on the Charter issue. The Tribunal had express power 
to determine questions of law, and so the case fell squarely within 
Douglas College and Cuddy Chicks, and it was not really necessary to 
rule on the case where the power to determine questions of law was 
merely implied. However, the Court took the opportunity to reappraise 
and restate the law.9 The Court held that a tribunal with power to deter-
mine questions of law, whether the power was express or implied,10 was 
presumed to have the power to determine the constitutional validity of 
any potentially applicable law. That presumption could be rebutted only 
by showing that the legislation empowering the tribunal “clearly in-
tended to exclude Charter issues from the tribunal’s authority over 
questions of law.”11 That clear intention would normally be evidenced 
by legislative provision for an alternative route for the resolution of 
Charter issues coming before the tribunal.12  
In this case, there was nothing in the Appeal Tribunal’s empowering 
legislation that indicated an intention to exclude Charter issues from the 
Tribunal’s authority. It followed that the Tribunal could decide the 
Charter issue. (The Court went on to hold that the chronic pain provi-
sions were contrary to the Charter; the Court postponed the declaration 
                                                                                                                                
8  [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54. The opinion of the Court was written by 
Gonthier J.  
9  Id., at para. 3. 
10  Id., at para. 41. 
11  Id., at para. 3; see also para. 44. 
12  Justice Gonthier (at para. 44) expressly reserved the question of the constitutionality 
of “a provision that would place procedural barriers in the way of claimants seeking to assert 
their rights in a timely and effective manner, for instance by removing Charter jurisdiction 
from a tribunal without providing an effective alternative administrative route for Charter 
claims.” 
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of invalidity to give the legislature time to make better provision for 
workers incapacitated by chronic pain.)  
The constitutional question in Martin was whether a law was un-
constitutional for breach of the Charter of Rights. In Paul v. British 
Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission),13 which was decided by the 
Supreme Court of Canada at the same time as Martin, the question was 
whether a law was unconstitutional for breach of the aboriginal rights 
guaranteed by section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. This question 
came before the Forest Appeals Commission of British Columbia, 
which had to determine whether Mr. Paul, a registered Indian, had vio-
lated the statutory Forest Practices Code14 of the province. Mr. Paul had 
cut down three trees on Crown land, intending to use the timber to build 
a deck on his home. The Code prohibited the cutting of Crown timber, 
but Mr. Paul asserted that he had an aboriginal right to harvest logs. The 
Commission decided that it had the power to deal with this defence, but 
Mr. Paul immediately sought judicial review to stop the Commission 
from determining his aboriginal rights. The Supreme Court of Canada, 
in an opinion written by Bastarache J., held that the power of an admin-
istrative tribunal to determine whether a law was overridden by an abo-
riginal right was governed by the same rules as Martin stipulated were 
to be applied to Charter issues. In this case, the Commission had the 
power, under its empowering statute, to decide questions of law. That 
power was presumed to include the power to determine whether a po-
tentially applicable law was unconstitutional in its application to an 
Indian by reason of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. There was 
nothing in the empowering statute to indicate an intention to withdraw 
aboriginal rights issues from the jurisdiction of the Commission. There-
fore, the Commission had the power to hear and determine Mr. Paul’s 
defence of aboriginal rights, and the Commission should resume its 
proceeding in order to receive his evidence and determine the issue.  
In Paul, it was argued that the provincial legislature could not enact 
a law that had the effect of empowering a tribunal to determine ques-
tions relating to aboriginal rights. That would encroach on the federal 
power over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” in section 
                                                                                                                                
13  [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, [2003] S.C.J. No. 34. The opinion of the Court was written by 
Bastarache J. 
14  R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 159. 
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91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.15 Aboriginal rights came within 
the essential core of “Indianness,” which lay outside the power of the 
province. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this argument on the 
basis that adjudication was distinct from legislation. The power con-
ferred by the British Columbia Legislature on its Forest Appeals Com-
mission was solely an adjudicative one. The Commission was not 
granted the power to alter or extinguish aboriginal rights; it could only 
determine whether or not they existed. The Commission’s determina-
tions would be binding on the parties, of course, but they would not 
constitute precedents that were binding on other tribunals or courts, and 
they would be subject to judicial review on a standard of correctness.16 
Justice Bastarache drew the analogy of a provincial court, which has 
jurisdiction to apply the entire body of law, including federal law and 
constitutional law, to resolve disputes properly before it. A provincial 
administrative tribunal with power to adjudicate questions of law must 
also take account of all applicable legal rules, whether provincial, fed-
eral, or constitutional.17  
The effect of Martin and Paul is to take us back to where we 
thought we were after Douglas and Cuddy Chicks. Administrative tribu-
nals with power to decide questions of law are presumed to also have 
the power to decide questions of constitutional law where the validity of 
a potentially applicable law is put in issue. The power to decide ques-
tions of law may be express or implied. Since the power to decide nor-
mally carries with it the implicit power to determine all questions of fact 
or law that are needed to reach a decision, it follows that most adminis-
trative tribunals with adjudicatory functions will be empowered to de-
cide constitutional issues. There are some tribunals that lack the power 
to decide questions of law, for example, because their empowering 
statute remits questions of law to another body for decision. Those tri-
bunals lack the power to decide constitutional issues. And there are 
some tribunals that possess the power to decide questions of law gener-
ally, but whose empowering statutes withdraw constitutional issues 
from their jurisdiction. In those cases, the presumption that the power to 
decide questions of law carries with it the power to decide constitutional 
                                                                                                                                
15  (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
16  Paul, supra, note 13, at para. 31. 
17  Id., at para. 21. 
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questions is rebutted. Those tribunals also lack the power to decide 
constitutional issues.  
In R. v. Seaboyer,18 the Supreme Court of Canada decided that a 
judge presiding at the preliminary inquiry of an indictable offence had 
no jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of a “rape-shield law” that 
purported to limit the accused’s right to cross-examine the victim of a 
sexual assault. The Court acknowledged that the preliminary inquiry 
judge would have the power (and the duty) to rule on the admissibility 
of the evidence presented at the inquiry, but the Court held that that 
power did not extend to determining the constitutionality of a statute 
that purported to prohibit the admission of evidence. This decision pre-
dates the decisions in Martin and Paul, and is inconsistent with those 
decisions. Clearly, the preliminary inquiry judge has an implied power 
to decide questions of law, since he or she has to rule on the validity of 
the charge and the admissibility of evidence presented at the inquiry. 
Under the doctrine laid down in Martin and Paul, the power to decide 
questions of law raises the presumption that the decision-maker also has 
the power to determine the constitutionality of any potentially applica-
ble law. There seems to be no ground to rebut that presumption. Indeed, 
it is hard to see how the preliminary inquiry judge can decide whether 
the accused should stand trial if the judge must blindly follow unconsti-
tutional legislation. Unfortunately, despite the announced intention of 
the Supreme Court of Canada in Martin and Paul to “reappraise and 
restate” the law, in neither case did the Court make any mention of 
Seaboyer. To be sure, Martin and Paul were concerned with administra-
tive tribunals, not inferior courts, but the law could not be more restric-
tive for a court than for an administrative tribunal. Therefore, I think it 
is safe to regard Seaboyer as impliedly overruled. The preliminary in-
quiry judge has the power to decide constitutional questions that affect 
the validity of the charge or the admissibility of the evidence tendered in 
support of the charge. More generally, any statutory court with express 
power to decide questions of law is presumed to also have the power to 
decide the constitutional validity of any statute that is potentially rele-
vant to an issue that is properly before the court. 
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III.  REMEDY UNDER SECTION 24 
Section 24(1) of the Charter of Rights provides as follows: 
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have 
been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent 
jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate 
and just in the circumstances. 
Section 24(2) goes on to deal explicitly with the exclusion of evidence 
that was obtained in breach of the Charter of Rights. Such evidence 
“shall be excluded” if its admission “would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute.” 
As we saw in the earlier section of this article, the primary remedy 
for unconstitutional action is nullification under the supremacy clause of 
section 52. Where it is a law that is held to be unconstitutional, nullifica-
tion under section 52 will usually be the remedy sought, and often that is 
all that the aggrieved party seeks. But section 24 permits other remedies 
to be obtained, and this will be important where it is an act (as opposed 
to a law) that is held to be unconstitutional. For example, the aggrieved 
party may seek an injunction, an award of damages, or an award of 
costs. Section 24 is much narrower in its scope than section 52. Whereas 
section 52 applies to all breaches of the Constitution of Canada, section 
24 applies only to breaches of the Charter of Rights, which is contained 
in sections 1-34 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Whereas section 52 may 
be applied by any court or administrative tribunal that has power to 
decide questions of law (as discussed in the previous section of this 
article), section 24 may be applied only by a “court of competent juris-
diction.” An administrative tribunal, even if it has jurisdiction to decide 
questions of law, will not be able to grant a remedy under section 24 
unless it is a “court of competent jurisdiction.” 
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that an administrative tribu-
nal is a court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of section 24 if 
its enabling statute gives it power over (1) the parties to the dispute, (2) 
the subject matter of the dispute, and (3) the Charter remedy that is 
sought. The first two of these three criteria are obvious. An administra-
tive tribunal would not be properly seized of a case, let alone empow-
ered to grant a remedy, if it did not have jurisdiction over the parties and 
subject matter. It is the third criterion that gives rise to difficulty. It 
requires that the tribunal have power under its enabling legislation to 
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grant the remedy that is sought. Applying this rule, the Court held in 
Weber v. Ontario Hydro19 that a labour arbitrator was a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction which could grant a declaration and damages under 
section 24 for breaches of the Charter (unlawful surveillance of employ-
ees) by Ontario Hydro. Ontario’s labour relations statute conferred on 
arbitrators the power to award declarations and damages. This supplied 
the necessary remedial power to make the arbitrator (who had jurisdic-
tion over the parties and subject matter) a court of competent jurisdic-
tion.  
The opposite result occurred in Mooring v. Canada (National Pa-
role Board),20 where the Court held that the National Parole Board was 
unable to exclude from a parole hearing evidence that had been obtained 
in breach of the Charter. Although the Board had jurisdiction over the 
parties and subject matter, its enabling statute required the Board to take 
into account “all available information that is relevant to a case.” That 
requirement, the Court held, removed the exclusion of evidence from 
the Board’s remedial powers. Therefore, the Board was not a court of 
competent jurisdiction for the purpose of excluding evidence under 
section 24. 
A persistent, but ineffective, critic of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada’s jurisprudence under section 24 has argued that the Court should 
not have interpreted the phrase “court of competent jurisdiction” in 
section 24 as restricting an administrative tribunal to those remedies that 
it already possesses under its enabling legislation.21 The argument is 
that, once a tribunal (or court) has jurisdiction over the parties and sub-
ject matter, it should be treated as a court of competent jurisdiction with 
the power under section 24 to grant “such remedy as the court considers 
appropriate and just in the circumstances.” Under this reading, section 
24 is itself the source of the power to grant an appropriate and just rem-
edy. Not only does this seem the plainest reading of section 24, it 
greatly improves the capability of enforcing the Charter. If section 24 is 
the source of the remedial power, then a legislative body cannot prevent 
a tribunal (or court) from granting an appropriate and just remedy for a 
                                                                                                                                
19  [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929, [1995] S.C.J. No. 59. 
20  [1996] 1 S.C.R. 75, [1996] S.C.J. No. 10. 
21  Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Carswell, 4th ed. 1997, annually supple-
mented), sec. 37.2(f). 
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Charter breach. This reading also would enable new remedies to be 
fashioned for Charter breaches where the existing remedial powers did 
not provide for a remedy that was appropriate and just.  
Despite the force of these arguments, the Supreme Court of Canada 
in R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc.,22 has recently explicitly reaffirmed the rule 
in Weber and Mooring: an administrative tribunal (or court) is a court of 
competent jurisdiction to grant a Charter remedy only if it has the power 
independently of the Charter to grant the remedy. The issue in 974649 
was whether a justice of the peace, sitting in Ontario as a provincial 
offences court, could order costs against the Crown under section 24 for 
a breach of the Charter (consisting of a failure to make timely disclosure 
of evidence to the defence). The difficulty was that the statute empower-
ing the court conferred only a very narrow power to award costs against 
the Crown; there was no power to award costs for failure to make proper 
disclosure to the defence, and no general power to award costs for 
Crown misconduct. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized that the 
award of costs was an appropriate and just remedy in this case, but re-
fused to go to section 24 as the source of the court’s power to grant the 
remedy. The remedial power had to be derived “from a source other 
than [s. 24 of] the Charter,” which in the case of a statutory court meant 
“its enabling legislation.”23 However, the Court said, a remedial power 
may be implied as well as express. Although the enabling legislation 
withheld any general power to award costs, the Court held that the 
“function and structure”24 of the provincial offences court was suitable 
for the award of costs for Charter breaches, and for that reason the legis-
lation should be interpreted as conferring by implication the power to 
award costs for Charter breaches. Therefore, the provincial offences 
court was a court of competent jurisdiction with the power to make an 
award of costs against the Crown. 
The result in 974649 was that an appropriate and just remedy was 
awarded for a Charter breach. But the Supreme Court of Canada’s impu-
tation of an implied power in the provincial offences court’s enabling 
legislation seems a contrived and convoluted path to that result. The 
same result would have been achieved more directly by acknowledging 
                                                                                                                                
22  [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575, [2001] S.C.J. No. 79. 
23  Id., at para. 26. 
24  Id., at para. 43. 
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that section 24 itself grants the necessary remedial power to a court that 
has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Obviously, the 
Court is now settled in its determination not to interpret section 24 in 
this fashion. However, the Court seems anxious to achieve much the 
same result by the roundabout route of implying remedial powers into 
the enabling legislation. If the Court continues to be imaginative in its 
implications from the function and structure of each court or tribunal 
that is faced with a breach of the Charter, we need not fear that Charter 
breaches will go unremedied. 
IV.  JUDICIAL REVIEW 
When an administrative tribunal decides a constitutional question, 
even if its decision is not subject to appeal, it is subject to judicial re-
view by a superior court. Indeed, an attempt by Parliament or the legis-
lature to enact a privative clause to bar judicial review of a constitu-
tional determination would be unconstitutional.25 On judicial review of a 
constitutional determination by an administrative tribunal, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has consistently insisted that the standard of review is 
correctness.26 Constitutional determinations by administrative tribunals 
receive no curial deference. Even if the tribunal has reached a reason-
able interpretation of the Charter, the reviewing court will still decide 
the constitutional question in the way it believes to be correct. Neverthe-
less, the tribunal’s initial determination of the constitutional question 
will normally make a useful contribution to the ultimate resolution of 
the issue. The tribunal’s knowledge of the regulated field — the context 
in which the question is to be decided — is likely to produce a well-
informed assessment of the constitutional arguments, which will assist 
the reviewing court in reaching its “correct” decision. 
                                                                                                                                
25  Hogg, supra, note 21, sec. 7.3(f). 
26  Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, supra, note 2, at 605; Cuddy 
Chicks v. Ontario, supra, note 3, at 18; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. 
Martin, supra, note 8, at para. 31; Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), 
supra, note 13, at paras. 31, 32. 
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V.  DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY 
There is another limitation on the power of administrative tribunals 
to decide Charter issues. The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently 
insisted that the tribunal that makes a finding of invalidity has no power 
to make a declaration of invalidity.27 What the Court seems to mean by 
this is that a decision by a tribunal that a law is unconstitutional is no 
more than a decision that the law is inapplicable to the particular case. It 
is not a binding precedent. It has no effect outside the particular case: it 
“is not binding on future decision makers, within or outside the tribu-
nal’s administrative scheme.”28 According to the Court, only “superior 
courts” have the power to issue binding declarations of invalidity that 
will invalidate a law with general effect.29  
VI.  PRACTICE OF TRIBUNALS 
Despite the arguments of constitutional principle that support the 
power of administrative tribunals to decide constitutional questions, it is 
undoubtedly the case that some administrative tribunals are not well-
placed to decide constitutional issues, whether because of the lack of 
expertise of their members or because of the volume of cases they have 
to decide. As a matter of institutional design, it probably does make 
sense to expressly remove the power to decide constitutional issues from 
some tribunals, as has been done in some enabling statutes.30 Of course, 
this is not a practical solution for the tribunal whose enabling statute has 
not addressed the issue. 
A tribunal that is faced with a constitutional issue that it must decide 
will often have to make some changes to its normal procedures.  
If the constitutionality of a statutory provision is the issue, then 
there is a statutory requirement in all provinces and territories that no-
tice of the constitutional question be served on the relevant Attorney 
General and often on two Attorneys General (provincial and federal). 
A similar requirement applies to federal tribunals, except that all 11 
                                                                                                                                
27  Cuddy Chicks, id., at 17; Martin, id., at para. 31; Paul, id., at para. 31. 
28  Martin, supra, note 8, at para. 31. 
29  Cuddy Chicks, supra, note 3, at 17. 
30  For example, Ministry of Health Appeal and Review Boards Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, 
c. 18, Sch. H, s. 6(3); Ontario Works Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 25, Sch. A, s. 67(2). 
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Attorneys General must be served. If no notice has been served, then the 
tribunal is debarred from considering the constitutional question.31 If a 
notice has been served, the Attorney General will be entitled to inter-
vene in the proceedings and may well do so, which will bring an extra 
counsel to the hearings and perhaps additional evidence and argumenta-
tion.  
Apart from the Attorney General, private parties or public interest 
groups may also seek to intervene in the proceedings. The tribunal will 
have to decide whether its rules permit interventions and, if so, whether 
they should be permitted in the particular case, and, if so, whether the 
intervenors should be permitted to lead evidence and generally behave 
like a party. Evidence may be more extensive than in a normal proceed-
ing, and the tribunal will have to decide whether it needs to adopt more 
elaborate practices akin to discovery so that the evidence is fairly ad-
duced and each side has opportunities to counter evidence offered by the 
other side. A full record will have to be compiled. All this may involve a 
very different kind of proceeding than the tribunal regularly conducts. 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
The end result of these developments is that nearly all administra-
tive tribunals (those with power to decide questions of law) have power 
to determine the constitutionality of laws that are potentially relevant to 
the cases before them, and have the power under section 52 to refuse to 
apply those laws that are found to be unconstitutional. And nearly all 
administrative tribunals (those that have jurisdiction over the parties, the 
subject matter and — if only by implication — the remedy) have power 
to determine breaches of the Charter by the executive, and have the 
power under section 24 to award an appropriate and just remedy. This 
seems to be the right result as a matter of constitutional principle. It 
seems obvious to me that individuals should be able to invoke the Char-
ter in the earliest and most convenient forum; that administrative tribu-
nals in applying the law should apply the whole body of law, including 
the Charter; and that the Crown should not be effectively liberated from 
its Charter duties when it appears before an administrative tribunal. That 
                                                                                                                                
31  Notice requirements are discussed in Hogg, supra, note 21, sec. 56.6(a). 
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said, there are certainly tribunals that are not suitable for the decision of 
constitutional issues. Where the knowledge and expertise of the mem-
bers, the volume of cases, or other considerations, make a tribunal un-
suitable for the decision of constitutional issues, the only remedy is to 
amend the enabling statute to withdraw the function from the tribunal. 
 
 
